Great Power Competition 2.0: Sino-Russian Challenges to US Cyber Primacy
Modern society heavily relies on new technologies for its correct functioning. The way we work, pay our bills, drive, shop, and make friends have been profoundly affected by recent developments in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) – the so-called Information Revolution. These technological advancements have also deeply influenced relations among states, to such an extent that understanding the impact of ICT on international relations has become key to making sense of global politics. In this article I look at the impact of technological developments on great power competition, and more particularly at how American primacy has been increasingly challenged by competitors, like Russia and China, in and through cyber space.
With respect to the cyber environment, the strategic competition between the United States, and China and Russia has taken different forms. This includes: US-Sino competition with regard to intellectual property theft and 5G wireless technology; US-Russian competition regarding influence operations and election interference; and US-Sino-Russian competition concerning the development of global norms of internet governance and acceptable behavior in cyber space. I will suggest that the United States could leverage the capabilities of its domestic private sector to mitigate the challenges coming from China and Russia in and through cyber space.
US vs. China
The US government has long complained that Chinese hackers are stealing billions of dollars in intellectual property from US companies. One of the Trump administration’s main justifications for starting a trade war with China was to stop China from carrying out intellectual property theft. The Trump administration acknowledged that IP theft supports “China’s strategic development goals, including its science and technology advancement, military modernization, and economic development.” In other words, Chinese activities in cyber space are perceived as a core element of the broader US-Sino strategic competition for global influence.
Another serious concern for the United States is the current role of Chinese tech companies, especially Huawei, as frontrunners in the development of the global infrastructure for 5G wireless internet networks. 5G is the next (fifth) generation of cellular technology, and it promises to greatly enhance the speed, coverage, and responsiveness of wireless networks. Since 5G networks will be able to carry significantly larger amounts of information, US officials fear that China could leverage Huawei’s privileged position in foreign 5G networks to steal even more intellectual property and to perform even more effective espionage activities. Moreover, 5G networks will also connect to the internet a new generation of devices such as smart factories and autonomous vehicles, raising the concern that Beijing could sabotage or shut down those systems if there was a military conflict with the United States. US concerns rest on the assumption that Chinese tech companies have an obligation to cooperate with the Chinese government. This assumption is supported by two pieces of Chinese legislation- the 2017 National Intelligence Law and the 2014 Counter-Espionage Law- which seem to require the Chinese private sector to do so.
The US government’s response to this perceived threat has so far included the imposition of sanctions against China; domestic legislation aimed at limiting the presence of Huawei and other Chinese tech companies in the infrastructure of US cyber space; and a global diplomatic effort to convince allies and partners abroad to apply similar policies. The Chinese government and Huawei have consistently denied these accusations.
US vs. Russia
The events of the 2016 US presidential election were a serious wake-up call for the United States. After a number of investigations, it is now a widely accepted truth that Russia conducted operations aimed at sowing divisions among US citizens, spreading distrust toward the candidates, and delegitimizing the political system in general.
Russian interference in the 2016 election took different forms. First, online operators used social media platforms to post false stories and promote divisive content. Second, Russian agents hacked into the computer networks of US political parties, stole confidential information, and leaked it to the public. Third, hackers probed election-related computer systems in 21 states, allegedly succeeding in penetrating a small number of them.
The exact impact of Russian influence operations on the outcome of the election is unclear but the simple fact that Russia was able to do what it did represents a significant threat to the legitimacy of the US political system. US authorities have repeatedly assured that they have found no evidence that any vote was altered by foreign cyber activities.
Russia’s interference in the US election can be interpreted as a violation of state sovereignty, insofar as Russian actions were aimed at interfering with an inherently governmental function - the running of elections. In addition to the legal argument, US officials perceive the goal of weakening the US government and dividing US society as part of Russia’s broader strategy of challenging US power.
To date, the US government’s response to Russia’s hostile activities has included legal action in the form of indictments; diplomatic action in the form of sanctions and expulsions of diplomatic personnel; executive actions and domestic legislation to prevent election interference, to increase the resilience of the election infrastructure, and to punish the perpetrators of malicious activities.
US vs. China and Russia
The strategic competition between the United States, and China and Russia is also taking place in the development of international norms of state behavior in cyber space. An especially contentious issue has been the future of internet governance. The United States is advancing its preferred view of a global and open internet while China and Russia are promoting their own view of a sovereign and controlled internet. These contrasting views are often referred to as the multi-stakeholder internet model versus the cyber-sovereignty model. Multistakeholderism advances the idea of an open and free internet driven largely by global market competition along with some government regulation and civil society participation. Cyber-sovereignty prioritizes state control over national “borders” in cyber space with stringent governmental restrictions on the flow of information.
Great power competition has led to the creation of two distinct fora within the United Nations working on the development of cyber norms: the Group of Governmental Experts, sponsored by the United States, and the Open-Ended Working Group, sponsored by Russia and China. This is yet another example of China and Russia challenging US global influence; especially given the United States’ traditional role as the “creator” of the internet and of trendsetter in cyber space.
Leveraging the resources of the US private sector
Arguably the ICT-related private sector in the United States is the most developed in the world even when compared to its Chinese or Russian counterparts. Therefore, to fend off challenges coming from its competitors, the US government should find imaginative ways to leverage the capabilities and skills present in its private sector. Some of these initiatives are already taking place. However, their actual effectiveness is still unclear; meaning that further dialogue and confidence-building measures between the US government and its potential partners in the private sector are needed. Here are just a few examples.
First, the US private sector could help to mitigate Chinese intellectual property theft through coordinated threat intelligence sharing with the US government. In fact, intellectual property theft often occurs when hackers are able to exploit a system vulnerability. US companies, such as Microsoft, have sensors spread across an incredibly large number of networks which put them in the privileged position to timely detect vulnerabilities and malicious behavior. By effectively sharing this intelligence with the government, private companies could reduce the ability of hostile hackers to succeed in stealing intellectual property.
Second, US private companies like Facebook and Twitter could help to mitigate the impact of online influence operations targeting US elections. They could do so by removing and/or flagging fake content and also by taking down false accounts. Moreover, vendors of election-related systems could contribute to the defense of US elections by agreeing on and adhering to cyber security standards and best practices for their products.
Third, US private companies could also play a critical role in developing norms of acceptable behavior in cyber space. Given the more business-friendly and liberal nature of the multi-stakeholder model, the efforts of the private sector are more likely to contribute to the advancement of the view of internet governance favored by the United States. Examples of private sector’s initiatives in this area include the Cyber Security Tech Accord and The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyber Space.