US and Iran in the Time of Trump
With the world’s attention on Coronavirus, the rapid escalation of tensions between Iran and the US has receded from the world's attention. Only a few months ago, the two sides were trading hostile rhetoric and targeted strikes.
Two years after the Trump Administration withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and the 5+1 Powers, what does the future hold?
I put this question to Reza Marashi, a former employee of the State Department’s Office of Iranian Affairs in the administrations of George H. Bush and Barack Obama. Marashi later was Director of Research at the National Iranian American Council. Contributing frequently to prominent media outlets, he is now the host of The Message podcast.
The current situation is not good! Iran does a lot of stuff that America doesn’t like, and America does a lot of stuff that Iran doesn’t like. In an effort to resolve their differences, they agreed to address the elephant in the room five years ago- Iran’s nuclear program. Two years of negotiations produced a landmark diplomatic agreement – the JCPOA – that served as a foundation from which dialogue on other points of contention could grow. Trump’s election brought back into power a small but virulent minority of ideologues who believer that might makes right, and thus the only way to resolve differences between Washington and Tehran is for the more powerful United States to do everything in its power to weaken, destabilize, and ultimately overthrow the Iranian government. And that’s where we are today.
What has the relationship been like over the last eight years?
Over the past eight years, the relationship has gone from slowly improving to rapidly combustible. From 2012 to 2016, the Obama administration prioritized using diplomacy to resolve problems with the Iranian government. More progress was made in those four years than in the previous four decades combined. From 2016 to 2020, the Trump administration has intentionally discarded its predecessors’ diplomatic achievements, cut off almost all direct channels of communication with Iran, and put Washington and Tehran back on the trajectory toward a military confrontation.
What are Iran’s strategic goals for the region?
Overall, Iran’s regional strategy is a by-product of its larger geopolitical strategy, which aims to consolidate the Islamic Republic as a regional power. The cornerstones of its strategy are:
1) Improving, or at least maintaining, ties with immediate neighbours and key Islamic countries. Relations with Turkey and Saudi Arabia are key factors in Iran’s regional positioning for influence in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and elsewhere.
2) Consolidating Iranian regional pre-eminence with indigenous technical capabilities. The country’s nuclear program, missile tests, and satellite launches are all facets of this strategic track.
3) Standing up to American pressure, and only relenting when America demonstrates a willingness to compromise.
Historical precedent has shown Iran that Western powers tend to accept the status of a regional power when that power becomes formidable; China, India, and Brazil are often cited as examples. The Islamic Republic is counting on such an eventual acceptance. The key virtue from Iran’s perspective has been patience. Decision-makers in Tehran know that the cost of this strategy is high – sanctions, isolation, and conflict are not negligible – but they believe that Iran must assume the role of an accepted regional power. If the West insists on making Iran yield on issues of contention through pressure alone – in particular its nuclear program, support for Hezbollah and Hamas, and human rights violations – Iranian strategy will continue to be predicated on patience and a conviction that it can eventually succeed by playing the long game. If nothing else, this serves as a sober reminder to its rivals that Tehran will not back down from the current standoff, as Iranian decision-makers believe that if the Islamic Republic does not “give up,” the other side will do so in due course.
How do we, as a Western audience interpret the underlying meaning of the Iranian governments messaging to the outside world?
Iran does not have the multi-million-dollar PR and lobbying machine that other Middle Eastern countries have in Western capitals. As a result, it’s had to use social media to bypass the restrictions of conventional media, speak directly to people in English, and reframe Iran and its senior leadership in the eyes of people living outside of Iran. Using this kind of digital diplomacy gives Iran cover to change course from the more hard-line outward appearance exemplified during the Ahmadinejad years, and thus helps it save face and make compromise with Western countries easier (when America is willing and able to reciprocate). Perhaps most importantly, the best way for people living outside of Iran to gain an understanding of Iranian perspectives/voices is to visit Iran!
How much of the survival of the regime linked to the nuclear programme?
Zero percent. The longevity of the regime has nothing to do with the nuclear program. Instead, it is based on four key factors: legitimacy in the eyes of the population; efficiency in managing the affairs of the state; unity amongst political elites; and the government’s monopoly on violence. Government legitimacy and efficient management have long been shaky, but political elites are thus far not at each other’s throats in a way that threatens regime stability. Perhaps more importantly, few would dispute the notion that Iran’s government will use force against protestors if survival of the system is thought to be at stake.
Does the current U.S. administration have a recognisable strategy?
If we take the Trump administration at face value, its Iran “strategy” seemingly consists of three broad-based pillars: viewing Iran as a zero-sum adversary in the Middle East; pushing Europe to adopt a more confrontational Iran policy across the board; pursuing regime change in Iran. Each of these pillars has been tried and failed by Trump’s predecessor dating back to 1979. There is no reason to believe they will succeed today. In reality, this is not a strategy but rather a petty attempt to settle scores both by Trump (killing Obama’s signature foreign policy achievement) and his senior military advisors (who sheepishly blame Iran for American military failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and want “payback."
The JCPOA – could it be revived by pressure from the Europeans, Russians or Chinese? Or would a new U.S. administration new to draw up a completely new arrangement?
Pressure – whether it comes from Europe/Russia/China, or America – is not going to revive the JCPOA. The status quo as it exists today clearly demonstrates that reality. Iran is already the most sanctioned country in the world. The only “pressure” that remains is war, and that would be a fool’s errand. Lest we forget, the JCPOA was working until the Trump administration withdrew America from the agreement. Thus, the only prerequisite to reviving the agreement is America resuming the fulfilment of its JCPOA obligations. Iran would welcome such a move from the U.S., and it has publicly said as much. There is no need for a new U.S. administration to draw up a completely new arrangement. If such an arrangement was possible, it would’ve been produced at the negotiating table in 2015. The JCPOA is the best result that the domestic political realities in America and Iran could produce. If the JCPOA is successfully implemented by both sides for an extending period of time, that would build the requisite trust for going beyond the scope of the JCPOA and building upon it.
What possibilities could the 2020 election have on the U.S./Iranian relationship?
If Trump wins, there will be a low level of likelihood that the US-Iran relationship will improve. If Biden wins, the question isn’t whether the US-Iran relationship will improve, but how much. Many of Biden’s advisors either helped negotiate the JCPOA or are proponents of the agreement. The biggest obstacle in the Biden camp are sanctions advocates who erroneously believe that Iran can be further squeezed into additional concessions. We won’t know which camp in Biden’s team will win that internal debate unless he wins the election – which is far from guaranteed.
If Donald Trump is re-elected could there be a change in policy towards Iran?
It’s possible, but it’s not likely. A president is only as smart as the people that he surrounds himself with, and as I previously mentioned, all of Trump’s advisors are opposed to improving US-Iran relations, and would thus be incentivized to sabotage any meaningful attempts at engagement spurred by Trump – similar to what happened to Trump’s attempts at cutting a deal with North Korea. For any meaningful and durable improvement in US-Iran relations to occur while Trump is president, he will have to surround himself with an entirely new set of advisors, or cut them out of the process and set up a parallel team. This change would have to include his son-in-law Jared Kushner, who is close friends with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
What could be some long-term impacts that the policies of the Trump administration have on U.S./Iranian relations?
As the Trump administration pursues regime change in Iran, it is also trying to take steps that would institutionalize the enmity between Washington and Tehran so that any successor to Trump will not be able to improve bilateral relations. The first step is through unilateral American sanctions, which have proven notoriously difficult to unwind – especially when Congress is involved. The second step is through repeated attempts to kill the JCPOA by trying to force Iran to withdraw from the agreement entirely.
—Reza Marashi is the host The Message
—Andrew Wall is a graduate student at UCD Clinton Institute